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1 Introduction
In Australia, the way cardholders are charged for using ATMs that are not owned by their
bank (“foreign ATM transactions”) has changed since the 3rd of March 2009: consumers
now have to pay a usage fee to the owner of the ATM. The “direct charging reform” was
initiated by the Reserve Bank of Australia to replace another pricing scheme in which each
foreign ATM transaction was involving the payment of two fees: a foreign fee, paid by the
cardholder to its own bank, and an interchange fee, paid by the cardholder’s bank to the
owner of the ATM. In the new system these two fees disappear.1
According to the proponents of the reform (see Reserve Bank of Australia and the Aus-
tralian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2000), there were several problems attached
to the pricing scheme in place before 2009. First, consumers were sometimes ill-informed
about the price of foreign ATM transactions. Second, interchange fees were bilaterally nego-
tiated between financial institutions and the regulator feared insufficient price flexibility and
competition in the market for foreign ATM transactions. The regulator also suspected that
banks could pass a high level of the interchange fee on retail prices of bank services.2 By
replacing interchange fees and foreign fees by fees that are directly and non-cooperatively
charged by the ATM owners on shared transactions, the regulator wants to promote compe-
tition, encourage ATM deployment, and make pricing more transparent.
In a previous paper (Donze and Dubec (2009)), we study how switching from a pricing
regime with interchange fees and foreign fees to a regime with direct charging affects ATM
deployment, consumer welfare and banks’ profits. We consider two horizontally differentiated
1Actually, the new pricing scheme still permits banks to use foreign fees. Nevertheless according to the
Payments System Board Annual Report (Reserve Bank of Australia (2009)) nearly all banks have eliminated
foreign fees since March 2009.
2The collusive effect of the interchange fee has been analyzed by Matutes and Padilla (1994) and Donze
and Dubec (2006, 2009).
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banks. We show that direct charging boosts ATM deployment. Under direct charging, bank
i can use the ATM fee si it charges to bank j’s cardholders to enlarge its deposit market
share: by increasing si, bank i makes it less interesting for consumers to bank with j since
their foreign withdrawals become more expensive. As a consequence, each bank sets ATM
fees above the level it would choose if it considered the withdrawal market separately from
the deposit market. These high ATM fees make it more profitable for banks to process
foreign withdrawals than under the regime with interchange fees and foreign fees. In turn,
banks have more incentives to deploy ATMs under the direct charging regime. We show
that this effect is so strong that banks deploy “too many” ATMs: their profits are negatively
affected. Consumers benefit from switching to direct charging if travel costs to reach cash
are high. In this case they enjoy the larger ATM network even if accessing cash is more
expensive. If travel costs are low, they prefer the smaller but less expensive network of the
regime with interchange fees and foreign fees.
In the present paper, we examine how introducing independent ATM deployers (IADs) in
the analysis affects banks’ profitability and consumer welfare under direct charging. We show
that paradoxically, the IAD entry benefits banks! The intuition is the following. Suppose
first there is no IAD in the withdrawal market. As foreign withdrawals are not free, a
consumer prefers to become a cardholder of a bank with a large ATM market share in
order to reduce the frequency of such withdrawals. Hence, a bank can attract depositors
by expanding its network. This effect is weakened as IADs enter the market. Indeed, their
ATMs are accessible to all cardholders at the same price and consequently, banks become
less differentiated by their networks. They have less incentives to deploy machines and their
profits increase. We also show that consumer surplus decreases as the first independent
deployers enter the market: the IAD entry makes banks deploy less ATMs and it becomes
increasingly difficult for cardholders to find a free machine. However as more IADs enter,
consumer surplus may increase if consumers sufficiently value the enlargement of the total
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ATM network.
Our analysis is related to previous works. In 1990, Salop designed the direct-charging
scheme to eliminate the interchange fee and enhance the self-regulation of the withdrawal
market. He argued that direct charging should induce a larger ATM network than the scheme
with interchanges fees and foreign fees. He noted that although banks could use ATM fees
strategically to enlarge their deposit market shares, this effect should be weak. Massoud and
Berhnardt (2002) build a model to study this depositor stealing effect of ATM usage fees.
They show that banks set high account fees for their own customers but do not charge them
for ATM usage. In contrast, banks set ATM fees for non-customers at a level exceeding
what would maximize ATM revenues. We extend their analysis by endogenizing the ATM
deployment and introducing IADs. In Donze and Dubec (2010), we study the effects of
a cost-based regulation of the interchange fee, an alternative reform to limit its collusive
power. There are a fixed number of banks and independent deployers. We show that over
time, this regulation scheme makes the interchange fee fall which reduces banks’ incentives
to deploy free ATMs and pushes IADs to deploy pay-to-use machines. In the present article,
banks’ machines are also replaced by IADs’ pay-to-use machines. However, this requires an
increasing number of independent deployers.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the model. In section 3, we
consider the benchmark case in which there is no IAD. In section 4, we consider the case
with banks and IADs. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The model
There are two banks denoted by i ∈ {1, 2} located at the two ends of a product space [0, 1].
A mass one of consumers of banking services are distributed uniformly along this product
space. There are d independent ATM deployers denoted by k ∈ {1, ..., d}.
Banks and IADS
Bank i provides its cardholders with basic banking services and the free access to its ni
ATMs in exchange of an account price pi. The marginal cost of providing the basic services
is constant and normalized to zero. IADs do not have cardholders and just provide ATM
services. The number of ATMs operated by IAD k is denoted by n̂k. The total number of
ATMs is n = n1+n2+
∑k=d
k=1 n̂k. The cost of deploying and operating an ATM is c for a bank.
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We take into account cost differences between banks and IADs: the cost of deploying and
running an ATM is µc for a IAD where µ is an exogenous parameter satisfying 0 < µ ≤ 1.4
The marginal cost of processing a withdrawal is normalized to zero.
We consider the following direct charging scheme:
• There is no interchange fee.
• Bank i does not charge its own cardholders for ATM usage.
• Bank i’s cardholders pay a fee sj to bank j for each withdrawal made at an ATM of j.
• IAD k charges all cardholders a fee ŝk per withdrawal made at its machines.
3This cost includes installation, depreciation, site rental, maintenance, communication costs, cash replen-
ishment, and the opportunity cost of the cash in the machine.
4Empirical evidence available for the USA and the UK suggests that µ = 0.5 is a reasonable value. In
the UK, the typical cost for a bank of operating an ATM is £19,000 per year on premise, and £33,000 off
premise. The cost is £9,500 for an IAD (House of Commons, Treasury Committee. 2005). In the USA,
according to the 2006 ATM deployer report (Dove Consulting, 2006), a large bank incurs annual operating
costs of $13,572 (on premise) and $20,832 (off premise). The cost is $8,160 for a large IAD.
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In other words, each bank discriminates between its own and its competitor’s cardholders
for ATM usage. On the contrary, IADs charge the same fee to everyone.
Consumers
Their reservation utility is equal to zero. A customer who becomes a cardholder of bank i
located at a distance δi in the product space anticipates a surplus equal to:
vb − tδi + vi − pi (1)
The term vb represents the fixed surplus from consuming basic services. The second term
tδi is a differentiation cost in the product space (where t > 0). To guarantee the existence
of a solution, vb and t must sufficiently large with vb ≥ 32t. The term vi corresponds to the
variable net surplus from consuming withdrawals. More precisely,
vi = ui(ni, nj, n̂1, ...n̂d, q
i
i, q
j
i , q̂
1
i , ...q̂
d
i )− sjqji −
d∑
k=1
ŝkq̂
k
i (2)
where qii is the number of domestic withdrawals made by a cardholder of bank i, q
j
i is the
number of withdrawals made by this cardholder at bank j’s ATMs (with j 6= i), and q̂ki is
the number of withdrawals at IAD k’s ATMs.
To construct the variable gross surplus function ui, we follow Donze and Dubec (2006) and
Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller, Sandon´ıs, and Santamar´ıa (2009). During the period, any cardholder
of bank i faces w needs of withdrawing cash. We assume that when looking for cash, the
probability to find an ATM deployed by a particular deployer (bank or IAD) is equal to its
ATM market share. Once an ATM has been found, any further search is infinitely costly.
Consumer’s valuation of this withdrawal is r where r is a random draw following a uniform
law over [0, 1]. As a consequence the withdrawal occurs with probability one if the ATM
belongs to i. It is made with probability Pr(sj ≤ r) = 1−sj (respectively Pr(ŝk ≤ r) = 1−ŝk)
if the ATM belongs to bank j (respectively to IAD k). The following surplus function ui is
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consistent with this framework:
ui = (q
i
i −
n
2wni
(qii)
2) + (qji −
n
2wnj
(qji )
2) +
d∑
k=1
(q̂ki −
n
2wn̂k
(q̂ki )
2) (3)
Indeed, by differentiating vi with respect to q
i
i, q
j
i and q̂
k
i we obtain the following demands
for withdrawals: the cardholder makes qii withdrawals using i’s ATMs, with
qii = w
ni
n
(4)
and qji withdrawals using bank j’s machines:
qji = w
nj
n
(1− sj) (5)
and q̂ki withdrawals using IAD k’s machines:
q̂ki = w
n̂k
n
(1− ŝk) (6)
Note that as IAD k does not discriminate between the cardholders of the two banks, the
cardholders make the same number of withdrawals using k’s ATMs, whatever their affiliation.
As a consequence, we will drop subscript i in q̂ki from now on.
Plugging expressions (4), (5) and (6) into (3) and then (2), we obtain the expression of the
optimized variable net surplus:
vi =
w
2
(
ni
n
+
nj
n
(1− sj)2 +
k=d∑
k=1
n̂k
n
(1− ŝk)2
)
(7)
The optimized surplus depends on the ATM market shares negatively weighted by the ATM
fees. It does not depend on the total network size: consumer welfare does not change if
all deployers double the number of their ATMs. It comes from the fact that the number of
times where cardholders have a need for cash is independent of the total network size. We
will relax this assumption later on.
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Demands and profits
We deal with cases where the market for deposits is entirely covered. Let δ denote the
distance between bank 1 and the consumer who is equally off between purchasing services
from bank 1 or 2:
v1 − tδ − p1 = v2 − t(1− δ)− p2 (8)
We obtain the deposit market size of bank i:
Di =
1
2
+
1
2t
(vi − vj − pi + pj) (9)
Note that IADs do not compete with banks in the market for deposits and provide exactly the
same withdrawal services to all cardholders. Hence their existence does not affect consumers’
decision where to bank.
The profit of bank i can be written
pii = piDi + siq
i
j(1−Di)− cni (10)
The first part of the profit corresponds to the revenues from selling basic banking services.
The second part corresponds to the revenues coming from the withdrawals that bank j’s
cardholders make at bank i’s machines. The third part corresponds to the cost of deploying
and operating the machines. The profit of IAD k is
pik = ŝkq̂
k − µcn̂k (11)
In this expression, revenues come from a mass one of cardholders making each q̂k withdrawals
at k’s IADs.
Timing of the game
First, banks and IADs choose the number of ATMs they deploy and prices non-cooperatively
and simultaneously. Second, consumers choose their banks and withdraw cash.
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3 The case without independent ATM deployer
We take d = 0. To characterize the equilibrium, it is convenient to start by determining the
account fee. Setting ∂pii/∂pi = 0 and the symmetric condition for bank j, we obtain
p∗i = t+ siq
i
j (12)
The account fee is the sum of the differentiation parameter and the cost for bank i of
accepting an extra consumer. The latter is actually an opportunity cost corresponding to
the revenues that bank i would obtain if the consumer chose to become a cardholder of bank
j, making qij withdrawals at i’s ATMs.
Let us determine ATM fees. The first order condition is ∂pii/∂si = 0 or
(pi − siqij)
∂Di
∂si
+
(
si
∂qij
∂si
+ qij
)
(1−Di) = 0 (13)
The first term measures the effect of modifying si on bank i’s deposit market share. By
increasing si, bank i becomes more attractive for consumers because they want to avoid
costly foreign withdrawals. Its deposit market share increases. The second term is the effect
of modifying si on the revenues coming from foreign withdrawals.
We determine equilibrium deployment: we have ∂pii/∂ni = 0 or
(pi − siqij)
∂Di
∂ni
+ si
∂qij
∂ni
(1−Di) = c (14)
By installing a supplementary ATM, bank i attracts extra depositors: the first term shows
how its revenues are affected by these newcomers. Because of the supplementary ATM,
bank j’s cardholders also make more foreign withdrawals: the second term measures the
corresponding extra revenues for bank i. To highlight the properties of the equilibrium, we
compare deployment and welfare in two cases:
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• Independent markets. We study what would happen if banks did not take into
account the effect of modifying their network size or their ATM fees on the deposit
market: we set ∂Di/∂ni = ∂Di/∂si = 0.
• Interconnected markets. We take into account the spillovers between the deposit
market and the withdrawal market. Here a bank can increase its deposit market share
by setting a higher ATM fee, si or by deploying more machines.
The results are established in appendix 1 and given in table 1. The surplus of the indifferent
consumer (CS) is written net of vb − 3t2 . Similarly banks’ total profits (BS) are written net
of t. The total surplus is denoted by TS.
n∗ p∗ s∗ CS BS TS
Independent markets 1
16
w
c
t+ w
8
1
2
3w
16
3w
16
3w
8
∧ ∨ ∧ ∨ ∨ ∨
Interconnected markets 5
18
w
c
t+ w
9
2
3
w
6
− w
18
w
9
Table 1: comparison of surplus with independent
and interconnected markets.
The results are summarized in the following proposition :
Proposition 1 The existence of spillovers between the withdrawal market and the deposit
market makes banks deploy much more ATMs, set lower account fees but higher ATM usage
fees compared to the hypothetical situation where spillovers are neutralized. This affects
banks’ profits, consumer surplus, and total surplus negatively.
When markets are interconnected, banks use ATM deployment and ATM pricing to attract
depositors. Consequently, they deploy more ATMs and charge higher ATM fees. Both banks
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lose from this race because deposit market shares are ultimately unchanged while ATM
deployment has exploded. Their profits are even smaller than if they did not provide ATM
services at all. Consumers are also worse off because ATM fees are higher. Probably that the
regulator tends to underestimate these spillover effects when he evaluates the desirability of
the ATM direct pricing scheme. For example, on average, banks lose money on their ATM
operations in the USA.5 According to Dove Consulting (2006), the average monthly revenues
for on premise ATMs were $1,104 while expenses were $1,444. Furthermore, Knittel and
Stango (2006) estimate that large banks’ surcharges were 71% higher than their level if the
withdrawal market was considered as a stand-alone business. In the next section, we show
that the entry of IADs in the ATM market enlarges consumers’ choice and diminishes banks’
incentives to deploy ATMs as a way to increase their deposit market shares. Banks install
less ATMs which is good for their profits.
4 Effects of independent deployers entry on banks’ prof-
itability and consumer welfare
We now assume that IADs are present in the market: d > 0. We first study the equilibria
of the game for a given d and then study how welfare is affected as IADs enter the market.
4.1 Typology of the equilibria for a fixed number of IADs
We look for the Nash equilibrium of the game. Solving bank i’s maximization problem
in prices yields the same expression for the account price as under the case with no IAD:
5Although the American ATM pricing scheme (interchange fee, foreign fees and surcharges) and the
new Australian pricing scheme are not the same, they are formally equivalent, according to the so-called
neutrality result (Salop (1990), Croft and Spencer (2004), Donze and Dubec (2009), Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller,
Sandonis and Santamaria (2009)).
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p∗i = t + siq
i
j. ATM fees are also the same: s
∗
i = 2/3. It comes from the fact that in our
framework, the willingness to pay for a withdrawal is not affected by deployment. We solve
the maximization problem of IAD k. We start by determining the ATM fees. The first
order condition is ∂pik/∂ŝk = 0 which yields ŝ
∗
k = 1/2. Note that s
∗
i > ŝ
∗
k. Indeed, IADs do
not intervene in the deposit market, and contrary to banks, they do not use ATM pricing
strategically to attract depositors: they choose lower ATM fees. Let us finally consider the
deployment problem. The first order condition is ∂pik/∂n̂k = 0. We have
ŝk
∂q̂k
∂n̂k
= µc (15)
Comparing expression (15) with expression (14) indicates that IAD k does not face the same
incentives to deploy ATMs as bank i. There are two factors pushing IAD k to deploy less
ATMs than a bank. First, IAD k does no use ATM deployment strategically to act in the
deposit market. Second, at equilibrium ŝ∗k < s
∗
i : processing a foreign withdrawal is less
profitable for an IAD than for a bank. There are also two factors pushing IAD k to deploy
more ATMs than a bank. First, IAD k charges all cardholders for their withdrawals. Second,
IADs have a cost advantage over banks when µ < 1. In appendix 2, we verify that there
are three types of equilibria according to the value of µ. They are detailed in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose d ≥ 1. The value of µ determines three possible zones of equilibria:
• Zone 1: 9
10
≤ µ ≤ 1. Only banks deploy ATMs: n∗ = 5
18
w
c
,
n∗i
n∗ =
1
2
, p∗i = t+
w
9
.
• Zone 2: 3
4
(1− 1
d
) < µ < 9
10
. Both banks and IADs deploy ATMs:
n∗ = 5+d
18+4µd
w
c
.
n∗i
n∗ =
9+(12µ−9)d
18+4µd
,
n̂∗k
n∗ =
9−10µ
9+2µd
, p∗i = t+
2
9
n∗i
n∗w.
• Zone 3: µ ≤ 3
4
(1− 1
d
). Only IADs deploy ATMs: n∗ = 1
4
d−1
d
w
µc
,
n̂∗k
n∗ =
1
d
, p∗1 = p
∗
2 = t.
12
The three zones of equilibria are illustrated in figure 1 and compared with the case where
d = 0 . When µ is high (close to one), IADS are inactive. Indeed, banks deploy so many
machines to attract depositors that the small cost advantage of IADs is not sufficient to
make the ATM activity profitable. When µ takes intermediate values, both banks and IADs
deploy ATMs. In this case the total network size and the ATM market share of IADs increase
as their cost advantage over banks becomes higher (ie when µ decreases). When µ is low,
banks do not deploy ATMs and they just produce basic banking services. Note that this
zone does not exist when d = 1.
Figure 1: Deployment
4.2 Effect of IADs’ entry on profits and welfare
We now study how consumer surplus and banks’ profits are modified as the number of IADs
increases starting from d = 0. In what follows, the surplus of the indifferent consumer is
written net of vb − 3t2 . Banks’ total profits are also written net of t. We have to distinguish
three cases. The results are established in appendix 3.
(i) Suppose that µ ≥ 9
10
. We are in zone 1 of proposition 2. In this case IADs do not deploy
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any ATM and hence consumer surplus and banks’ profits are not affected as the number of
IADs, d, increases. We have BS = −w
18
, CS = w
6
, TS = w
9
.
(ii) Suppose that 3
4
≤ µ < 9
10
. We are in zone 1 of proposition 2 for d = 0 and in zone 2
for any d ≥ 1. As new independent deployers enter the market, the total number of ATMs
rises. Banks’ ATM market share decreases but remains positive. Banks’ total profits are
BS(d) = −2
3
w
(3− 3d+ 4µd)(9 + 9d− 8µd)
(18 + 4µd)2
(16)
They are increasing in d. Indeed banks deploy less and less ATMs because the IAD entry
makes it more difficult for them to differentiate and attract new depositors by installing
ATMs. IADs’ surplus is equal to
IADS(d) = dw
(9− 10µ)2
(18 + 4µd)2
(17)
It is first increasing and then decreasing in d. The first IADs that enter the market make
positive profits. However IADs’ total profits decrease as more and more independent deploy-
ers chase a constant number of potential withdrawals, w, with an ever-increasing number of
ATMs. Consumer surplus is equal to
CS(d) =
1
8
w
24− 6d+ 12µd
18 + 4µd
(18)
CS is a decreasing function of d. It is the result of three effects of the IAD entry on consumer
surplus. There is a negative effect: consumers make more foreign withdrawals because bank
i’s ATM market share diminishes. There are two positive effects. First, on average, foreign
withdrawals become cheaper because they are increasingly made at IAD ATMs and less
and less at bank j’s ATMs. Second, account prices also decrease. Indeed, p∗i is the sum of
the differentiation parameter t and the opportunity cost of accepting a new cardholder (the
foregone ATM fees he would have paid to bank i if he had chosen to bank with j). This
opportunity cost decreases as IADs enter the market and deploy ATMs. The negative effect
dominates the two positive effects so that consumer surplus falls with the IAD entry.
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The effect on total surplus is the following:
- Total surplus increases if 3/4 ≤ µ ≤ 171/226 ' 0.757. Here IADs have a substantial
cost advantage over banks and they obtain a large ATM market share as entering the
market. Banks deploy less ATMs and their profits increase. The rise of banks’ profits
outweighs the fall of consumer surplus.
- Total surplus decreases and then increases if 171/226 < µ < 4/5.6.
- Total surplus decreases if 4/5 ≤ µ ≤ 3/4. In this case the cost advantage of IADs is not
sufficient to obtain a large ATM market share. The fall of consumer surplus outweighs
the small rise of banks’ surplus.
(iii) Suppose that µ < 3
4
. Let us define d˜ by
d˜ =
3
3− 4µ (19)
When there is no IAD (d = 0), we are in zone 1 of proposition 2. For a number of IADs
between 1 and d˜, we are in zone 2. For d above d˜ we are in zone 3. As independent deployers
enter the market, more and more ATMs are deployed but banks’ ATM market share decreases
and reaches zero when d ≥ d˜. Consumer surplus first decreases when d varies from zero to
d˜. In this case, it is given by expression (18). Thereafter it becomes equal to w/8. From
d = 1 to d˜, banks’ profits are given by expression (16) and increase. Thereafter, they become
equal to zero: banks give up ATM activities to focus on the production of basic services.
Total surplus first increases and then decreases: initially the IAD entry makes banks better
off which makes the total surplus increase. This positive effect vanishes when the number
of IADs becomes larger than d˜. In this case, banks abandon the ATM business: their
surplus and consumer surplus become constant. Total surplus follows the IADs’ surplus and
decreases. We sum up the main results in proposition 3 and table 2.
6The minimum is reached for d = 9(3−4µ)2(9−4µ)(4/5−µ) .
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Proposition 3 The entry of IADs weakens the relationship between the deposit market and
the withdrawal market. Banks deploy less ATMs and their profits increase. Consumer surplus
decreases because they make more and more foreign withdrawals. When the cost advantage
of IADs is sufficiently high, total surplus increases up to some entry level.
Zones CS BS IADS TS
µ < 3
4
1, 2, 3 ↘ ↗ ↗↘ ↗↘
3
4
≤ µ ≤ 171
226
1, 2 ↘ ↗ ↗↘ ↗
171
226
< µ < 4
5
1,2 ↘ ↗ ↗↘ ↘↗
4
5
≤ µ < 9
10
1,2 ↘ ↗ ↗↘ ↘
µ ≥ 9
10
1 −→ −→ −→ −→
Table 2: variation of consumer surplus, banks’ surplus, IADs’
surplus and total surplus as the number of IADs increases.
To illustrate the surplus variations, we have drawn TS, CS, BS and IADS for w = 50, c =
15000 and different typical values of µ in figure 2.7 The figure shows that while the IAD
entry is always beneficial for banks, it is only good for total welfare for low values of µ. For
the empirically realistic case µ = 0.5 (see footnote 4), the best result is obtained for a limited
IAD entry (d = 4). Consumer surplus is always monotonically decreasing as IADs enter the
market. We have noted before that it becomes more and more difficult for a cardholder to
make free withdrawals because IAD ATMs replace banks’ ATMs gradually. Furthermore,
we have chosen a surplus function where consumers do not benefit from the enlargement of
the total network. It is interesting to relax this assumption: in what follows, we extend our
model to consider the case where consumer surplus is increasing in the total network size.
We show that in such a case, the IAD entry may increase consumer welfare.
7Parameters have been chosen so that at equilibrium, total ATM deployment is close to 1/1000, which
is a reasonnable value.
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Figure 2: Surplus variations for a fixed number of cash needs
We assume that the number of times a cardholder looks for an ATM is wnγ (with 0 ≤ γ < 1):
cardholders are willing to make more withdrawals as the network grows. The demand for
withdrawals become qii = wn
γ ni
n
, qji = wn
γ nj
n
(1− sj) and q̂ki = wnγ n̂kn (1− ŝk). To take into
account these changes, we modify the expression of surplus (3) by replacing n by nγ. The
optimized variable net surplus becomes
vi =
1
2
wnγ
(
ni
n
+
nj
n
(1− sj)2 +
k=d∑
k=1
n̂k
n
(1− ŝk)2
)
(20)
When banks and IADs increase the size of their respective ATM networks by a factor λ > 1,
then consumer variable net surplus vi is increased by a factor λ
γ. The higher γ is, the more
consumers value an enlargement of the total network. When γ is equal to zero, we are back
to the previous case. We can verify that the equilibrium is
• If µ ≥ 9
10+2γ
, only banks deploy ATMs: n∗ = (5+γ
18
w
c
)
1
1−γ ,
n∗i
n∗ =
1
2
.
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• If 3
4
(1− 1−γ
d
) < µ < 9
10+2γ
, both banks and IADs deploy ATMs:
n∗ = ( 5+d+γ
18+4µd
w
c
)
1
1−γ ,
n∗i
n∗ =
9(1−γ)+(12µ−9)d
18(1−γ)+4(1−γ)µd ,
n̂∗k
n∗ =
9−10µ−2γµ
9(1−γ)+2(1−γ)µd .
• If µ ≤ 3
4
(1− 1−γ
d
), only IADs deploy ATMs: n∗ =
(
1
4
d−1+γ
d
w
µc
) 1
1−γ
,
n̂∗k
n∗ =
1
d
.
For simplicity, we do not describe the general properties of surpluses but just study several
cases graphically. We first focus on the empirically reasonable case µ = 1/2. The associated
surpluses are represented in the upper part of figure 3, for γ = 1/4 and γ = 1/2. The figure
shows when consumers value the size of the total network, their surplus first decreases with
IAD entry but thereafter increases as soon as the total network size expands sufficiently.
Figure 3: Surplus variation for an increasing number of cash needs
The lower part of figure 3 is drawn for µ = 0.75, a case where the IADs cost advantage is less
pronounced. Here the enlargement of the network due to the IAD entry is not sufficient to
compensate for the progressive disappearance of the free-to-use machines: consumer surplus
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decreases monotonically and the different surpluses look very much the same as in figure 2
for the same value of µ.
To sum up, IAD entry makes consumers better off, provided that IADs have a high cost
advantage over banks and that consumers have a marked preference for a large ATM network.
5 Conclusion
In 2009, the Australian regulator changed the ATM pricing scheme. It was the first attempt
to implement a more competitive approach of withdrawal markets. The Australian reform
could be imitated in other countries and it is therefore important to assess its implications,
both theoretically and empirically. In Donze and Dubec (2009), we showed that when travel
costs to reach cash are high, ATM direct charging boosts deployment and makes consumers
better off than the regime with interchange fees and foreign fees. However direct charging
places a burden on bank’s profitability. In this article we have shown that the entry of
independent deployers limits banks’ use of ATM deployment as a way to enlarge their deposit
market shares. Therefore encouraging the existence of independent deployers in the ATM
market can be an interesting way to improve banks’ profitability. The effect of the IAD
entry on consumer welfare is less evident, but here again, entry is the most favorable for
consumers when travel costs are high so that they value the associated enlargement of the
ATM network.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: proof of proposition 1
We start with the situation without spillover effects (∂Di/∂ni = ∂Di/∂si = 0), expression
(13) becomes
−1
2
si
ni
n
w +
1
2
qij = 0⇒ s∗i =
1
2
(21)
and (14) gives
1
8
w
n− ni
n2
= c⇒ n∗ = 1
16
w
c
(22)
We consider the situation with spillover effects. Using expressions (2) and (9) one can write
∂Di
∂si
= − 1
2t
∂vj
∂si
= − 1
2t
(
∂uj
∂qij
∂qij
∂si
− qij − si
∂qij
∂si
). (23)
However ∂uj/∂q
i
j = fj + si so that ∂vj/∂si = −qij. Hence we have
∂Di
∂si
=
1
2t
qij. (24)
Using expressions (12) and (24), one can rewrite (13) as
1
2
qij −
1
2
si
ni
n
w +
1
2
qij = 0⇒ s∗i =
2
3
(25)
Furthermore, we have
∂Di
∂ni
=
1
2t
∂(vi − vj)
∂ni
=
(sym eq)
2
9t
w
n
(26)
Expression (12) and (14) gives
2
9
w
n
+
1
9
n− ni
n2
w = c⇒ n∗ = 5
18
w
c
(27)
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Let us verify the second order condition, we have
H =

∂2pii/∂n
2
i ∂
2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂ni∂si
∂2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂p
2
i ∂
2pii/∂pi∂si
∂2pii/∂ni∂si ∂
2pii/∂pi∂si ∂
2pii/∂s
2
i

=

−4
9
w
n2
− 8
81t
n−ni
n3
w2 1
3t
w
n
− 1
9t
ni
n2
w 1
27t
ni
n2
w2 + 1
27t
(ni)
2
n3
w2
1
3t
w
n
− 1
9t
ni
n2
w −1
t
0
1
27t
ni
n2
w2 + 1
27t
(ni)
2
n3
w2 0 wni
n
(
1
9t
ni
n
w − 3
2
)

Det(H11) = −49 wn2 − 881tw2 n−nin3 < 0.
Det(H22) = +
1
81
w
36tn2−n2w−2nniw−n2iw
t2n4
> 0 if t sufficiently large.
Det(H33) = +
1
162
w2 ni
t2n5
(14nniw − 108tn2 + 3n2w + 3n2iw) < 0 if t sufficiently large.
Appendix 2: proof of proposition 2
The problem of maximization has two types of solutions: interior or corner. We have
∂pii/∂ni ≤ 0 and ∂pik/∂n̂k ≤ 0 for any i and k:
w
9
(3− ni
n
)n−1 − c ≤ 0 (28)
and
w
4
(1− n̂k
n
)n−1 − µc ≤ 0 (29)
We first look for (interior) solutions where the two first order conditions are satisfied with
equalities. We have
µ
w
9
(3− ni
n
) =
w
4
(1− n̂k
n
) (30)
However n = 2ni + dn̂k or 2
ni
n
+ d n̂k
n
= 1. Plugging this last equality in (30), we obtain
n∗i
n∗
=
9 + (12µ− 9)d
18 + 4µd
(31)
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and
n̂∗k
n∗
=
9− 10µ
9 + 2µd
(32)
Plugging (31) in (28) we obtain
n∗ =
5 + d
18 + 4µd
w
c
(33)
For the solution to exist, one must have
n∗i
n∗ ≥ 0 and
n̂∗k
n̂∗ ≥ 0 or equivalently 34(1− 1d) ≤ µ ≤ 910 .
Suppose 9
10
≤ µ, we obtain the corner solution n̂∗k
n̂∗ = 0 and
n∗i
n∗ =
1
2
. Condition (28) is satisfied
with equality while condition (29) is satisfied with inequality, we obtain n∗ = 5
18
w
c
.
Suppose µ ≤ 3
4
(1 − 1
d
), we obtain the corner solution
n̂∗k
n̂∗ =
1
d
and
n∗i
n∗ = 0. Condition
(28) is satisfied with inequality while condition (29) is satisfied with equality, we obtain
n∗ = 1
4
d−1
d
w
µc
.
Appendix 3. Consumer surplus, banks’ surplus, IADs’ surplus and total surplus
In what follows, the surplus of the indifferent consumer is written net of vb − 3t2 . Similarly
banks’ total profits are also written net of t.
Case 1. Let us assume that 3
4
≤ µ < 9
10
. For any d, we are in zone 2.
(i) Proof that CS is a decreasing function of d.
The surplus of the indifferent consumer is
CS =
1
8
w
24− 6d+ 12µd
18 + 4µd
(34)
Differentiating with respect to d, we obtain
dCS
dd
=
3
2
w
10µ− 9
(18 + 4µd)2
(35)
Expression (35) is negative because µ < 9/10 by assumption.
(iii) Proof that BS is an increasing function of d.
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Banks’ surplus is
BS(d) = −2
3
w
(3− 3d+ 4µd)(9 + 9d− 8µd)
(18 + 4µd)2
(36)
Differentiating with respect to d, we obtain
dBS
dd
= 8dw
(9− 10µ)2
(18 + 4µd)3
(37)
which is positive.
(iv) Variation of IADS
IADs’ surplus is
IADS(d) = dw
(9− 10µ)2
(18 + 4µd)2
(38)
We have
dIADS
dd
= w
(9− 10µ)2(18− 4µd))
(18 + 4µd)3
(39)
Hence IADS(d) is an increasing function in d up to d = 9/2µ and decreasing thereafter.
(iv) Variation of TS
Total surplus is
TS = CS +BS + IADS (40)
Differentiating with respect to d, we obtain
dTS
dd
= w
(9− 10µ) [d(40µ2 − 122µ+ 72) + 135− 180µ]
(18 + 4µd)3
(41)
This expression is negative for µ ≥ 4
5
. Suppose 3
4
≤ µ < 4
5
. The particular value µ̂ = 171
226
'
0.757 is constructed so that TS(1) = TS(0). When 3
4
≤ µ ≤ 171
226
, TS is increasing. Suppose
171
226
< µ < 4
5
. Let
d̂ =
9(4µ− 3)
2(9− 4µ)(4
5
− µ) (42)
When d = d̂, the term inside brackets in (41) is equal to zero. If d < d̂, dTS
dd
< 0. If d > d̂,
dTS
dd
> 0.
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Case 2. µ < 3
4
. Let us define
d˜ =
3
3− 4µ
When d = 0 we are in zone 1 of proposition 2. When 1 ≤ d ≤ d˜ we are in zone 2. When
d ≥ d˜, we are in zone 3.
(i) Variation of CS. For d ≤ d˜, consumer surplus is given by expression (34) and it is
decreasing in d. For d ≥ d˜, consumer surplus becomes constant and equal to w
8
.
(ii) Variation of BS. For d ≤ d˜, banks’ surplus is given by expression (36) and it is increasing
in d. For d ≥ d˜, banks’ surplus becomes constant and equal to 0.
(iii) Variation of IADS. For d ≤ d˜, IAD surplus is given by expression (38) and it is first
increasing in d and then decreasing. For d ≥ d˜, IAD surplus is equal to w
4d
and is decreasing.
(iv) Variation of TS. For d ≤ d˜, total surplus is given by expression (40) and it is increasing
in d. For d ≥ d˜, total surplus is equal to (1
8
+ 1
4d
)w and is decreasing in d.
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